Tutela igualitaria para consumidores diferenciados: la paradoja de la heterogeneidad en el derecho del consumidor
Barra lateral del artículo
Publicado:
nov 29, 2021
Palabras clave:
Consumidor, mercado, libertad, competencia, economía
Contenido principal del artículo
Resumen
Los consumidores tenemos diferentes preferencias, necesidades y limitaciones. No obstante ese dato incuestionable, los sistemas de protección al consumidor suelen apostar ciegamente por esquemas de tutela igualitarios. De manera incluso más grave, muchos esquemas igualitarios operan como esquemas mandatorios. En este trabajo, se plantea que tales esquemas lesionan severamente el principio de soberanía del consumidor y agravian al consumidor dado que se alejan del proceso espontáneo de mercado y lo reemplazan por diseños rígidos.
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Cómo citar
Rodríguez García, G. (2021). Tutela igualitaria para consumidores diferenciados: la paradoja de la heterogeneidad en el derecho del consumidor. Revista De La Facultad De Jurisprudencia., 1(10), 211. https://doi.org/10.26807/rfj.v10i10.382
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Artículo original (análisis)
Citas
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Baird, D. (2006). The Boilerplate Puzzle, Michigan Law Review, 104, (p. 933). Recuperado de: https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1532&context=mlr
Ben-Shahar, O. y Bar-Gill, O. (2014). La regulación de los contratos de consumo, En: Nuevas Tendencias del Moderno Derecho Económico, Thomson Reuters, Santiago de Chile, (p. 218).
Ben-Shahar, O. (2016). The paradox of access justice, and its application to mandatory arbitrarion, The University of Chicago Law Review, 83, 4, (p.1760). Recuperado de: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol83/iss4/10/
Ben-Shahar, O. y Porat, A. (2019). Personalizing mandatory rules in contract law, The University of Chicago Law Review, 86, (pp. 255-282). Recuperado de: https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/publication/personalizing-mandatory-rules-contract-law
Boettke, P. (2010). What happened to “efficient markets”?, The Independent Review, 4, 3, (pp. 363-375). Recuperado de: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1696084
Dam, K. (1970). Consumer protection: an overview, Antitrust Law Journal, 39, 4, (p. 919). Recuperado de: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40841875?seq=1
Durand, J. (2015). El código de protección y defensa del consumidor, retos y defesafíos para la promoción de una cultura de consumo resposable en el Perú, Revista de Actualidad Mercantil, No. 4, (p. 100), Recuperado de: http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/actualidadmercantil/article/view/14958
Ely, J. (2015). Let`s hope not, Cato Unbound: The end of asymmetric information?, Recuperado de: https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/04/15/jeff-ely/lets-hope-not
Hoppe, H.H. (2006). The economics and ethics of private property, Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy, Mises Institute, (p. 21).
Hutt, W. (1940). The concept of consumers` sovereignty, The Economic Journal, 50, 197, (p. 66). Recuperado de: https://academic.oup.com/ej/article-abstract/50/197/66/5269094
Murphy, R. (2018). The Rothbardian critique of consumer sovereignity, Mises Daily Articles, Recuperado de: https://mises.org/library/rothbardian-critique-consumer-sovereignty
Polinsky, A. M. y Shavell, S. (2010). The uneasy case for products liability, Harvard Law Review, 123, (p. 1471). Recuperado de: https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/polinsky_shavell.pdf
Priest, G. (1992). Can absolute manufacturer liability be defended?, The Yale Journal on Regulation, 9, (p. 240). Recuperado de: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1619&context=fss_papers
Priest, G. (2003). Small business, economic growth and the Huffman Conjecture, The Journal of Small & Emerging Business Law, 7, (p. 7). Recuperado de: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1636&context=fss_papers
Ramseyer, J.M. (2012). Products liability and product safety: Japan and the U.S., John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business, Discussion Paper No. 714, Harvard Law School, Recuperado de: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2084077
Rubin, P. (2019). The capitalism paradox: how cooperation enables free market competition, Post Hill Press, (p. 51), Nueva York - Nashville.
Saavedra, R. (2019). El fenómeno moderno de la contratación masiva: bases para los contratos por adhesión y las cláusulas generales de contratación, Ius 360, Recuperado de: https://ius360.com/el-fenomeno-moderno-de-la-contratacion-masiva-bases-para-los-contratos-por-adhesion-y-las-clausulas-generales-de-contratacion/
Sowell, T. (2013). Economía básica: un manual de economía escrito desde el sentido común, Deusto, Edición en español, (pp. 610-611).
Sunstein, C. (2012). Impersonal default rules vs. active choices vs. personalized default rules: a triptych, Digital Acces to Scholarship at Harvard, (p. 4). Recuperado de: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9876090
Tacker, T. (2019). Rethinking consumer protection: escaping death by regulation, Lexington Books, Londres (p. 18).
Waldfogel, J. (2005). Does consumer irrationality trump consumer sovereignty?, The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, 87, 4, Recuperado de: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40042886?seq=1
Whitman, J. (2007). Consumerism versus Producerism: a study in comparative law. The Yale Law Journal, 117, (pp. 346-347). Recuperado de: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1643&context=fss_papers
Wright, J. y Ginsburg, D. (2012). Behavioral law and economics: its origins, fatal flaws, and implications for liberty, Northwestern University Law Review, 103, 3, (p. 1061). Recuperado de: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1100&context=nulr
Zywicki, T. (2005). The consumer financial protection bureau and the return of paternalistic command-and-control regulation, Engage, Vol. 16, No. 2, (p. 49). Recuperado de: https://sls.gmu.edu/todd-zywicki/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2019/09/Zywicki-CFPB-Paternalistic-FINAL.pdf
Zywicki, T. (2016). Market-reinforcing versus market-replacing consumer finance regulation, Reframing financial regulation: enhancing stability and protecting consumers (Peirce y Klutsey, editores), Mercatus Center at George Mason University, (p. 336). Recuperado de: https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/peirce_reframing_ch12.pdf