Public choice y el consenso de Washington: el caso de la constitución peruana

Contenido principal del artículo

Oscar Augusto Súmar Albujar

Resumen

RESUMEN
En este artí­culo, el autor analiza si la constitución peruana es, como comúnmente se la conoce, la constitución más neoliberal de la región de América Latina. Para eso, estudia la influencia del Consenso de Washington en la reforma de la constitución peruana de 1993. También estudia otros factores en esa reforma, en particular lo que él llama el "otro consenso", que persigue otros objetivos, la mayorí­a de los sociales. Después de eso, identifica cómo se implementó la reforma, con especial énfasis en la influencia de la Corte Constitucional en Perú. Finalmente, y utilizando la teorí­a de la opción pública, analiza tres casos que le permiten concluir que la constitución peruana no responde a una ideologí­a particular, sino a valores mixtos que pueden ser utilizados por los grupos de interés de manera oportunista.


ABSTRACT
In this article, the author analyses if the Peruvian constitution is, as it’s commonly referred, the most neoliberal constitution of the Latin American region. For that, he studies the influence of the Washington Consensus in the reform of the Peruvian constitution of 1993. He also studies other factors in that reform, in particular what he calls the ‘other Consensus’, which pursuits other –most social– objectives. After that, he identifies how the reform was implemented, with special emphasis in the influence of the Constitutional Court in Peru. At last, and using the theory of public choice, he analyses three cases that let him conclude that the Peruvian constitution does not respond to a particular ideology but rather to mixed values that can be used by interest groups in an opportunistic manner.


KEYWORDS: Public Choice, Washington Consensus, Peruvian Constitutionalism, insentive, law and economics.


JEL CODE / CLASIFICACIÓN JEL: M13, D71

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Súmar Albujar, O. A. (2017). Public choice y el consenso de Washington: el caso de la constitución peruana. Revista De La Facultad De Jurisprudencia., 1(2). https://doi.org/10.26807/rfj.v1i2.17
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Artículo original (investigación)

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